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ABSTRACT 
VIOLENT RAPTURE IN THE AGE OF COMFORT: MAPPING CHARDINIAN 
CONVERGENCE IN O’CONNOR’S SOUTH 
BY SCARLETT WILSON 
The body of scholarship regarding Flannery O’Connor generally falls into one of three 
camps: biographical or historical readings of her work that attempt to either characterize a period 
of her life or ascertain her political beliefs, using her stories to reveal religious allusions that 
show her attempt to reinforce Christian morals, or, finally, readings engaging with a generally 
Girardian framework to show her criticism of Christianity itself. Biographical documents show 
O’Connor’s lifelong devotion to the Catholic faith, which, for many readers, problematizes the 
subversive prevalence of violence and blasphemous imagery in her body of work. However, 
these perspectives overlook the immense impact that 20th-century French Jesuit theologian and 
paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin had on her work, especially during her final years. As 
my argument will show, O’Connor critically responds to Teilhard de Chardin’s theory of 
convergence in a way that anticipates the later theories of French anthropologist René Girard 
regarding the social connections between violence and religion. Using the theories of these two 
thinkers in conjunction with discourse from the tradition of kenotic Christology, (a line of 
theological thinking which assumes that God partially or totally emptied himself of power when 
incarnating as Christ), I analyze four recurring stylistic devices that illuminate O’Connor’s own 
original theological framework: setting, pedagogical encounters, disfigurement, and the role of 
violence in relationship to revelation.  
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Introduction 
“Only some deeply grounded and fully paradoxical view of God can make sense of the notion 
that God knows and loves each of 5.9 billion of us. ” 
- Annie Dillard, ​For The Time Being 
Both within her own circle and within the literary world, Flannery O’Connor has had a 
complicated relationship with religion. Though an acknowledged and consistent Catholic in the 
American South, her similarly devout community denounced her violent and often scathingly 
ironic stories as inappropriate depictions of both Christianity and Southern culture, while literary 
scholarship largely reduces her to either a Southern Gothic writer or a progressive Catholic 
writer, alternatively a regionalist critic of Christianity or an unconventional Gothic preacher 
writing, as one scholar puts it, “prophetic altar calls to a tired world” (Bruner, 219). Though her 
Christian protagonists struggle with moral bankruptcy and generally approach a narrative 
“revelation”, the tendency to reduce her writing to a personal spiritual agenda ostensibly stems 
from the relative literary and political underrepresentation of both Southern and Catholic writers 
in the mid-20th-century United States. O’Connor herself explicitly expressed frustration at being 
pigeonholed by the critical community and even nods to her dilemma in “The Partridge Festival” 
(1961). When Calhoun, a young, aspiring writer tells his small-town Southern aunts of his plans 
to write a novel, they dismiss him, remarking “Maybe you’ll be another Margaret Mitchell” and 
remind him that his future writing necessarily represents Southern culture, saying “I hope you’ll 
do us justice...few do” (​The Complete Stories ​424). This reduction of her writing to regionalism 
largely limits scholarship to either biographical readings of her fiction or attempts to decode 
what must inevitably be a Christian didactic agenda.  
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However, these readings overlook her voice in a critical age in U.S. history during which 
theologians struggle to justify the use of Christianity itself in light of its failure to mitigate the 
unprecedented political violence of the 20th-century as well as its struggle to survive 
problemitizing scientific advancement. The conflict in O’Connor’s South not only rejects the 
notion of a crumbling Christian foundation but documents the intricacies of a recapitulated 
Christian-American identity and a rebirth of its church. Her contributions to the legacies of both 
Christian theology as well as religious anthropology, especially during the final years of her life, 
are often overshadowed by the tendency to focus on the uniqueness of her voice in the canon. In 
her exploration of human violence, O’Connor counterintuitively responds to contemporary 
theology that presents Christianity as an evolutionary mechanism driving humanity towards an 
ideal society (transcendence, if you will). To contextualize this exploration, I will use three 
theoretical models that might seem dissonant at first, but contribute to a broader, more nuanced 
foundation for approaching O’Connor’s final stories.  
As many biographical documents show, O’Connor began reading and enthusiastically 
reviewing translations of the writings of early 20th-century French Jesuit theologian and 
paleontologist Pierre Teilhard de Chardin as early as 1959, five years before her death in August 
1964. His immense influence on her fiction during this period is undeniable; the title of her last 
short story collection, ​Everything That Rises Must Converge ​(1965) comes directly from 
Teilhard de Chardin’s ​The Phenomenon of Man ​(1950), referring to his theory of convergence. In 
contrast with contemporary Catholic dogma, Teilhard de Chardin believed that Christianity 
serves a human evolutionary function that culminates in a united, transcended human existence 
or ‘convergence’ of individual humans (and groups) with one another and with god. However, to 
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eventually attain spiritual convergence, humans must struggle against and reflect upon their 
respective diminishment--circumstances that cause suffering such as disease, disability, or 
psychological impairments; those who refuse to grow and learn from their diminishments, 
labelled immobilists, miss the opportunity for convergence and fail to evolve.  His writings 
further posit that evolution drives both nature and humanity towards increasing complexification, 
or entropy and complication, which in turn fuels evolutionary change towards an Omega point, 
or point of divine unification and total convergence. This complexification includes the 
formation of the noosphere, or the ramified network of human thought and ideas that ostensibly 
functions as an evolutionary plane similar to the biosphere. Exploring O’Connor’s critical 
relationship to Teilhard de Chardin crucially informs her interpretation and deployment of his 
ideas, but more importantly explores how O’Connor presents society through the lens of 
convergence theory, namely by showing how the contemporary American Christian, largely 
sheltered from suffering and ambiguity, succeeds in achieving convergence and under what 
conditions this revelation actually manifests itself.  
Crucially, O’Connor’s prosaic, micro-level incarnations of convergence consistently 
incorporate Christian reflection in conjunction with the commission or experience of violence, 
suggesting that physical violence itself plays a vital and undertheorized role in the convergence 
model. In this thematic vein, she anticipates the thinking of later French anthropologist René 
Girard--notably his theory of sacrificial violence in ​Violence and the Sacred​ (1972). Though 
O’Connor clearly did not live to encounter his ideas, her fiction’s intervention into the 
evolutionary functions of violence and religion nonetheless contribute to the theoretical legacy of 
Christianity as an anthropological necessity. Girard argues that the Judeo-Christian religion 
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sprang directly from a social need to control human aggression and infighting as a result of 
innate mimetic desire, or jealousy over perceived resources. Violence towards a scapegoat figure 
alleviates the inevitable social tension that accumulates between jealous people (men, typically) 
and attains a sacred status due to its sacrificial role in keeping the community together and 
containing aggression. Thus, biblical figures such as Abel, for instance are considered sacred 
avatars for their sacrifice while Cain represents common humanity, perpetually overcome by 
bestial aggression. Like Teilhard de Chardin, Girard considers the Christ-event a paradigm shift 
in human capacity to attain peace, but not necessarily from an evolutionary perspective. Instead, 
he interprets the crucifixion as a singular violent event that ideally inspires the community to see 
the futility in violence and turn away from it. He posits that being confronted with the 
unsustainability of perpetual sacrifice will inspire the repudiation of violence itself: that the 
traumatic insight borne of such revelation will achieve what Teilhard de Chardin would 
ostensibly describe as convergence, a cohesive, inclusive human community whose members 
actively reject all forms of violence. 
Finally, underpinning both Teilhard de Chardin’s as well as Girard’s projects is the 
theological tradition of kenosis, a line of Christian thought originating in the idea that God 
emptied himself into the body of Christ, thus lessening or even repudiating his divine powers 
and, through altruistic sacrifice, epitomized the Christian ideal. According to kenotic 
Christology, the ideal Christian chooses to adhere to the example as Christ as closely as possible, 
striving to act with humility and altruism, thereby attempting to empty oneself of material 
preoccupations and proprietary self-interest to become an instrument of divine will. Though the 
legacy of kenotic Christology spans centuries and multiple Judeo-Christian expressions, perhaps 
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one of the most easily identifiable figures (and one with which O’Connor repeatedly engages) is 
that of the saint or ascetic whose self-denial and service to teaching and/or martyrdom indicate 
sacredness and adjacency to god. Reading these figures within a Girardian complex, however, 
questions the merit of their social function. Though scholars such as Susan Srigley suggest in her 
Girardian readings of O’Connor that ascetics can be viewed in the traditional kenotic light as 
they contain a perceived innate violence by turning it inward (the ‘love’ of Christianity 
materializing in a Christ-like ​self​-sacrificial violence) (37-8), such a reading underemphasizes 
Girard’s ostensible rejection of the ascetic. Girard’s theory attempts to identify the structural 
means of dismantling ​macroscopic ​human reliance on sacrificial violence, while ascetic practice 
focuses on an isolated individual’s personal attempt to achieve a morally transcendent state. The 
fundamental oversight in Srigley’s account is that it limits the scope of his theory to individual 
moral exemplarity. If we are to regard Christianity as an anthropological machine, ascetic 
self-sacrifice must be similarly qualified by its impact on human interaction: specifically, how 
does the ascetic impact society? Is he or she more or less successful in bringing ​society, 
especially contemporary society, to a post-violent state, or is the contemporary ascetic perhaps 
noble from a moral perspective but ultimately dysfunctional from a social one? Furthermore, 
how does whether or not a scapegoat is intentionally sacrificed contribute to the dismantling of 
the scapegoat system as a whole? I posit that O’Connor, given her interest in Teilhard de 
Chardin’s broad, evolutionary model of Christianity, suggests that her opinion of the ideal 
Christian necessarily involves his or her effect on others and social functioning, especially in 
light of potential imminent convergence -- and the consequent dismantling of normative 
partitions and as well as implicit as well as explicit mechanisms of social segregation. 
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Furthermore, the relative comfort and security of the white, post-war American lifestyle 
complicates the attempt to achieve the ‘selfless’ or truly altruistic aspect of kenosis. For instance, 
to what extent can education constitute a form of violence, given the fraught legacy of 
proselytism? 
These three perspectives anticipate a species-wide transformation of a traditional 
Christian human culture stretched to its breaking point. Moreover, each theoretical framework 
necessarily involves immersion in the secular. Like O’Connor’s fiction, they all explore the 
utility of Christianity in an increasingly atheistic and empirical era of human understanding, one 
which rejects miracles and the active benevolence of a protective god in favor of the immanent 
dramas found in psychology and political policy. However, Girard and Teilhard de Chardin 
reject the incompatibility of religion and the developing secular perspectives of human origin; 
they embrace Christianity with the vocabulary of anthropology and evolutionary biology, 
respectively, and from the merger they anticipate a resulting human transcendental peace, despite 
the recent memory of the World Wars. The rich legacy of kenosis serves a similar purpose in its 
recurring promptings to consider ​how​ the post-violent/convergent state is best achieved on an 
individual level and how sacrifice (specifically though suffering) contributes to this 
transformation. Despite these promptings, Girard’s thesis and the legacy of kenosis 
problematically interpret suffering as an indication of moral sanctity as well as the result of an 
imperfectly applied Christianity. Both frameworks insinuate, to an extent, that for the sacred to 
exist, its avatars or embodied personae must suffer at the hands of an inherently imperfect 
Christian or alien and hostile agent, which suggests that religion itself reinforces the perceived 
need -- even desire -- for the existence of the violent oppressor.  
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In Girard’s perspective, the pragmatic, post-violent world outgrows the training wheels of 
sacrificial Christianity, while in the kenotic ideal, a cooperative community enjoys freedom from 
the imminent threat of extrinsic violence but must also inherently suffer in a certain capacity. 
O’Connor addresses this disagreement over the role of suffering by suggesting that at least in the 
contemporary moment, extrinsic (that is, non-ascetic) violence is both imperative and inevitable 
in the journey towards convergence. She rejects Girard’s idea that revelation alone can lead to 
social transformation because, in the contemporary moment, political passivity in light of 
violence constitutes an act of violence itself; she argues that prosaic, white, middle-class 
comfort, though ostensibly pacifist, does not indicate a repudiation of violence but widespread 
participation in a violent mechanism that blinds the community to the violence of the mechanism 
itself, an active turning away from the manifold expressions of violence that are variously 
occluded or disavowed. Implicit in this interpretation is the inability for the revelation of 
violence to be taught without the active participation of the individual in the violence itself, 
either as oppressor or victim; it must be physically experienced, undeniably tangible.  
O’Connor thus rejects first-world comfort as an indication of the triumph of the Christian 
world-view over violence, instead revealing political intolerance, moral passivity, and 
closed-mindedness to be contemporary manifestations of prevailing violence or, at the very least, 
direct precursors to active violence. This comfort indicates the lack of an emergent and 
immediate motivation to act altruistically (a transposed memory of the Christ-event, so to speak) 
and facilitates spiritual stagnation, putting individuals at risk of participating in or permitting 
violence around them.​ ​This genre of latent violence seems innocuous, manifesting in problematic 
but non-confrontational behaviors, such as subtle racist microaggression or a preference for 
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political and/or racial isolation, yet these propensities directly result in physical altercations. 
O’Connor’s protagonists often recognize the violent potential of their political or ethical beliefs 
through retrospective revelatory experiences involving a confrontation with human suffering. 
O’Connor thus presents this singular trauma not so much as a kenotic event as a device that 
activates the kenotic capacity; she suggests that the Christian ideal involves a ​recognition​ of 
one’s implicit participation in violence before the repudiation of violence itself can be made. By 
extension, she implies that this recognition inherently activates the human ability to choose a 
future of violence or convergence -- that until this revelation occurs, the Girardian model 
dominates human volition; that regardless of intention, we are slaves to the political regime, 
religion, or philosophy that satiates our appetite for comfort until we are forced to experience the 
negation of comfort (that is, suffering). Only after experiencing this trauma can the individual 
appreciate the destructive potential of passivity and recognize the emergent need to repudiate 
violence.  
These frameworks provide the critical vocabulary with which to identify O’Connor’s 
own educated and intricate consolidation of secular and Christian realities and her practical 
efforts not to convert the atheist, but to confront the reader with the particular insidiousness of 
contemporary latent structures of violence and the evolutionary and moral cost of comfort. What 
many refer to as her Southern grotesques directly refer to participants in this latent violence due 
to their subscriptions to ideological and political mechanisms that advance the violent Girardian 
machine; the geography of material spaces and homes come to represent the indulged body 
which enjoys the rewards of the mechanism, disincentivizing revelation and independent will. In 
exchange for satiating the human appetite for comfort, which parallels corporeal temptation in 
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the kenotic model (or mimetic desire in the Girardian model), the mechanism renders the 
individual an agent to advance its ideological prerogatives. For instance, the stereotyped racist is 
not an individual but a cog within the (Girardian) mechanism of racism, which in turn secures 
the racist’s comfort; to disengage with racism, that is, recognizing the physical violence it 
produces, signifies the birth of the individual, independent of the need for the comfort the racist 
agenda affords and thus capable of discerning one’s independent will from the self-interested 
prerogatives of the violent machine. Further participation in racism after the revelation then 
becomes an intentional choice to embrace (as Girard would say) the Kingdom of Violence while 
repudiation would signify a step towards convergence, or the Kingdom of Love. Instead of “altar 
calls”, I posit that O’Connor’s stories encourage her readers towards a more truthful relationship 
with our own moral capacity -- our souls, if you will-- and to challenge the weakness of the 
stereotypes within us all. Secular or otherwise, she encourages us to nurture the part of the self 
that transcends the body and physicality it represents, offering an invitation to transcend the 
bestial and, more simply, the dangerously routinized and unthinking dimensions of social life.  
 
To most accurately engage with O’Connor’s most compelling theological discussions 
within the scope of the Girardian, Chardinian, and kenotic perspectives, I have selected five of 
her nine final short stories written after 1959 (that is, after she is confirmed to have studied 
Teilhard de Chardin) with the reasoning that these stories all reflect the most mature depictions 
of her radical religious framework. Four are from her posthumously published ​Everything That 
Rises Must Converge​ (1965) and can therefore be considered in direct conversation with Teilhard 
de Chardin, while another, “The Partridge Festival”, was written during the same period as the 
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others but not included in the collection. Although her other final stories certainly address similar 
theological dilemmas, these representative five chart an evolution in O’Connor’s approach to 
both the individual’s journey towards convergence as well as the spiritual utility of contemporary 
violence. This will become more apparent in the following sections, but for the sake of clarity, I 
will briefly summarize the five stories chronologically in order of composition. 
“The Comforts of Home”, written in the fall of 1960 follows a historian, Thomas, who 
lives with his widowed mother in a small Southern town. After meeting Star Drake (also known 
as Sarah Ham), a young nymphomaniac consistently in trouble with the law, his mother decides 
to welcome her into their home as an act of charity. However, the introverted, sexually timid 
Thomas perceives Star as a threat to his comfort as she flirts with him and provokes him. To 
justify his discomfort, he expresses the fear that an abundance of virtue yields an abundance of 
misfortune, referring to the classical philosophy of moderation. He begs his mother to expel Star, 
but she continually refuses and instead encourages him to empathize with her 
disenfranchisement. As a result of his frustration, Thomas begins to hallucinate his domineering, 
manipulative late father who belittles him for what Thomas perceives to be a comparative lack of 
masculine power. He eventually concocts a plan to have Star arrested, which includes planting a 
gun on her, but the plan unravels and in attempting to shoot Star, kills his intervening mother 
instead.  
The second story, “Everything That Rises Must Converge”, written in 1961, follows a 
similar narrative arc to the first. Julian, an aspiring writer who moves back from university to 
live with his mother, expresses frustration with her antiquated racial intolerance and her nostalgia 
for her pre-bellum aristocratic lifestyle. He considers himself a martyr for enduring her 
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problematic attitude, comparing himself to Saint Sebastian. He accompanies her to her reducing 
class at the Y because she fears riding the recently integrated public bus alone. After arguing 
over whether integration positively or negatively affects society, Julian becomes sullen and 
reflective until a large black woman resembling his mother boards the bus with her small son and 
sits with the two. Julian’s mother and the woman make casual conversation until both reach their 
stop and exit the bus together. However, out of misguided benevolence, his mother offers a 
penny to the child and the mother, recognizing the gesture as demeaning and offensive, hits her 
with her purse. Dazed, Julian’s mother begins to mutter incoherently while Julian chastises her 
for her lack of tact. As she collapses onto the sidewalk, Julian is jarred from his cynicism as he 
runs for help in the departing daylight, finally forced into compassion.  
O’Connor sets the third, “The Partridge Festival” (written before March 1961) again in a 
country town. Calhoun, a cynical, self-professed non-conformist, decides to leave the city to visit 
his aunts in their small town, Partridge, to gather information about Singleton, a wealthy resident 
who murdered six city officials because they did not allow him to enter a local festival without 
paying a registration fee. Calhoun considers him a modern-day Christ figure, aspiring to write a 
book about him. He eventually meets Mary Elizabeth, a young student home from university 
with a similar admiration for the murderer. They antagonize one another, each competing to 
appear more intellectually audacious than the other until they eventually decide to visit Singleton 
in the state hospital. The pair continues to compare him to Christ and as they near the hospital, 
they increasingly anticipate a profound spiritual change upon meeting him. However, when 
Singleton arrives at the visitation room, he makes crude, ineloquent remarks, suggesting his 
superiority over his fellow citizens, and sexually harasses Mary Elizabeth, chasing her around 
 
Wilson 14 
the room until the guards eventually subdue and extract him. Once back in the car, Calhoun and 
Mary Elizabeth sit in silent discomfort before staring intently at one another, an act that suggests 
the beginning of a romantic connection. 
In contrast to the above, O’Connor sets the fourth story, “The Lame Shall Enter First” 
(written in the summer of 1962) in a city (versus country/small town) setting. A widowed 
psychologist, Sheppard, works in a boys’ reformatory and lives with his young son Norton, 
whom he perceives as selfish and ungrateful. When one of his patients, a Christian zealot from 
the country, named Rufus Johnson, shows intellectual potential, Sheppard takes a special interest 
in his education and attempts to dissuade him of his religious beliefs to replace them with an 
interest in science, going as far as to opening his home to him when he leaves the reformatory. 
However, Johnson resents Sheppard’s secularity. Beyond generally antagonizing him, Johnson 
tricks Sheppard into providing a false alibi for his continued criminal activity and uses Norton’s 
unresolved grief over his mother’s death to convince him of the superiority of biblical dogma 
over secular understandings of mortality. Johnson continues to antagonize Sheppard until he 
finally rejects the boy after the police again arrest him for vandalism. Meanwhile, Norton hangs 
himself ostensibly in order to see his mother in the afterlife. Sheppard realizes the impact of his 
neglect only after he discovers his son’s body hanging from the rafters in the attic. 
Finally, “Revelation” (written before spring of 1964) returns to the town and follows 
Ruby Turpin, an obese, domineering farmer’s wife. Turpin accompanies her husband to the local 
clinic to be treated for a wound. In the waiting room she qualifies each person according to their 
race and class, discriminating between “trashy” and “common” people (491). Through her 
daydreams, O’Connor reveals Turpin’s belief in a divinely constructed social hierarchy, which 
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Christ intentionally maintains and populates according to favor. As she chats with her fellow 
“decent” people in the waiting room she expresses her gratitude towards Christ for “making 
everything the way it is” (499), and in reaction to this exclamation, the daughter of one of the 
patients throws a book at her and attempts to strangle her, calling her a warthog from hell. 
Dazed, Turpin eventually returns home and expresses frustration at God for allowing such 
misfortune to befall her as well as questioning the divine intent behind the girl’s message. She 
compares herself to Job as she ironically protests the injustice of her misfortune. While watering 
the pigs on her farm, she receives a vision (perhaps due to her head injury) in which a mass of 
souls climb a bridge to heaven in an order inconsistent with the social hierarchy, with black and 
poor people entering before “decent” folk like herself.  
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“Their Own Side of the Fence”: Setting and the Geography of Identity in the Integrated 
South 
The perception of Southern identity has been dominated by its relationship to territory 
both from cultural and historical perspectives. From its attempt to physically secede from the 
Union during the Civil War to its legacies of social stratification based on intergenerational 
land-ownership (such as pre-bellum aristocracy and later, sharecropping), connection to 
geography crucially informs the understanding of individual and communal identities. On the 
social scale, an individual’s ownership of land and his or her ancestral origin (which ostensibly 
includes race) indicate his or her position in the social hierarchy, which dictates where each 
community member lives, how they behave, and how much relative political power they wield. 
O’Connor’s characters faithfully express these preoccupations with territory, often to the point of 
embodying regional stereotypes of the geographical identities they represent. In O’Connor’s 
moment, racial integration poses an immediate threat to the territorial domination of white 
identity by transgressing against the norms of the social hierarchy and redistributing public land. 
The birth of new, integrated space crucially changes the geography of the Southern identity, 
dividing white, domestic geography into three distinct categories: the home (or the familiar, 
proprietary), the foreign (spaces belonging exclusively to another group), and the liminal space 
(integrated or similarly shared public spaces). The distinction between these spatial territories 
and the emphasis on the image of movement or travel evokes the language of Chardinian 
convergence; to physically converge insinuates the physical mutual approach and amalgamation 
of unlike mediums, while immobilism (which marks those who refuse to converge) indicates 
physical inertia. Using Chardinian vocabulary to read the interaction of O’Connor’s characters 
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with their respective settings suggests that successful convergence depends on a character’s 
travel to foreign territory, confrontation of the novel, and a rationalization of the latent violence 
the individual inevitably participates in, especially within the context of racial or political 
segregation.  
Immobilist characters generally perceive their identity as intimately related to their 
associated geography, which usually relates to an aspect of political power. For instance, Julian’s 
nostalgia for his mother’s antebellum childhood house most clearly shows this connection 
between identity and space:  
“[his mother says]‘The house had double stairways that went up to what was really the 
second floor -- all the cooking was done on the first. I used to like to stay down in the 
kitchen on account of the way the walls smelled. I would sit with my nose pressed against 
the plaster and take deep breaths.’...[I]t remained in [Julian’s] mind as his mother had 
known it...appear[ing] in his dreams regularly.” (408)  
Later referring to it as “the house that had been lost for him” (419), Julian’s nostalgia constructs 
a physical space to compensate for the innate right to superior political status (and 
land-ownership) “lost for” him and which he perceives his Southern whiteness to allow him. 
Through his mother’s recollections, he vicariously takes “deep breaths” of plaster in the kitchen, 
ingesting whiteness and filling his body with it, suggesting that the house and the power it 
represents supplies the tangible, physical aspects of his whiteness. Moreover, Julian uses the 
memory of the lost, castle-like house to mentally ingest this idealized, selective memory of 
pre-bellum whiteness to literally turn his head against the wall, ostensibly away from black 
slaves working in the kitchen, thus remaining blind or apathetic towards the black exploitation of 
 
Wilson 18 
labor involved in securing the house. Though he attended university and understands the white 
ethical failure of slavery, he nonetheless regards the Civil War a melancholic “loss” of both 
power and identity which forces him to access his whiteness only through this ‘ideal’ yet 
intangible depiction of it. Just as his mother uses her memory of geographical origin to inform 
her own racial identity, Julian’s mental reconstruction of this geographical symbol of his 
ancestors’ political dominance dictates the way he understands whiteness: as a physical 
indication of one’s right (perhaps not to own slaves), but certainly to own land, wealth, and 
political domination. As a result, he perceives himself as victimized, a white person 
disenfranchised from his whiteness through the fault of others. Though he performs the 
progressive university student stereotype, challenging his mother’s resistance to integration and 
(vainly) attempting to befriend black people, O’Connor suggests that this adopted identity cannot 
supercede the Southern connection to land; his understanding of political identity (whiteness) 
itself ​depends​ on his innate right to power and the innate undeservedness of others (black people) 
to power. 
More importantly, this political association between geography and whiteness acts as a 
proxy for the body, in addition to his perceived identity in relation to others. He visualizes his 
body as a silent monument to pre-bellum whiteness into which he can recede; he describes an 
“inner compartment of his mind” (411) as “the high-ceilinged room sparsely settled with large 
pieces of antique furniture” (423-4) which ostensibly refers to the room with double stairways in 
his mother’s childhood home. Here he “establish[es] himself when he [cannot] bear to be a part 
of” his surroundings, where he is “safe from any kind of penetration” and “free from the general 
idiocy of his fellows” (411). This geography is an intentionally paradoxical space; here he 
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“establish[es] himself”, yet is himself both creator and created, just as the house is both Julian 
and geography. Julian is thus both sign and signifier for the antebellum South; he not only 
inhabits the political identifiers of ‘whiteness’ and perceived ‘eliteness’ but embodies white 
supremacy itself, embracing the valuable (versus antiquated or old-fashioned) “antique furniture” 
of antebellum memories. His identification makes his perception of self abstract, invincible, and 
bodiless, representing the signs and signifiers of white maleness itself: by “establish[ing]” 
himself as both a house and the occupier of the house, as both creator and created, he eliminates 
the need to “bear” social interaction with others and even corporal experience itself. His refusal 
or inability to move out of the house, so to speak, impedes his ability to converge, physically and 
spiritually with others. This mental structure further informs the primacy of the antebellum 
nostalgic stereotype despite the adoption of the contradictory university student stereotype; even 
if he leaves his geography to change the occupier of the house, he is still his essential geography.  
Furthermore, Julian already perceives that he suffers, as a Southern prince robbed of his 
throne; his mental ‘suffering’ is ostensibly due to his martyring by the post-Reconstruction 
South’s denial of his innate right to supremacy. Reinforced by his comparison to Saint Sebastian 
“waiting...for the arrows to begin piercing him” (405) as he waits for his mother to prepare to 
leave the house, this ironic suffering is particularly informative from the perspective of kenosis. 
His self-perception as a saint at once shows that his suffering indicates his sacredness or, more 
appropriately, his exceptionality, but his reluctance to “bear ”(411) the discomfort of interacting 
with the physical world shows a discontinuity between his perception of suffering and his 
ostensible lack of actual suffering. The emotional turmoil he claims to experience not only 
originates in self-interest as opposed to altruism, but simultaneously shields him from the 
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extrinsic forces that could actually cause him to physically suffer. A Girardian framework 
underpins this rationalization of suffering; the self-insulation and uncomplicated superiority that 
Julian enjoys mirrors the Girardian community’s blindness to their complicity in the martyring of 
the scapegoat. His selective nostalgia, which overlooks the role of the exploitation of black 
people (the scapegoat) in his social privilege similarly overlooks the continued suffering of the 
black community and its continued bolstering of his privilege. He turns away from “bearing” the 
violent reality of the antebellum legacy but embraces the symbolic “arrows” of its gradual 
dismantling, indicating a growing internal tension indicative of a Girardian potential for 
aggression. This tension, along with his turning away, intensifies when Julian boards the 
integrated bus with his mother and witnesses the continued racial bigotry of other white people, 
which threatens to undermine the moral justification of his comfort. 
This mapping of interpersonal and intergroup geography reveals a cultural disinclination 
towards convergence due to the close association between identity and possession of land. 
O’Connor further typifies convergence as both a psychological and physical process; while 
Julian must dismantle his mental house in order to function with those different from him, he 
also must co-inhabit physical space. This dilemma marks a Chardinian intersection with the 
tradition of kenosis, which emphasizes the experience of the body; because the tradition 
maintains that God diminished himself to become incarnate/mortal through Christ and Christ in 
turn sacrificed himself for the benefit of humanity, to emulate Christ is to relinquish the material 
and suffer through the body as a gesture towards the spiritual. However, characters such as Julian 
lack this ability due to the ontology of their self-perception; by receding into himself, he rejects 
the body itself. The selfless element of kenosis, for O’Connor, requires a mental dimension of 
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kenosis to be accessed in addition to the physical, or a mental sacrifice of self to connect and 
converge with others. Given the possessive and fraught claims to land and by extension, the 
perception of the self and the body, the integrated space presents a unique opportunity for the 
sharing of self within liminal territories. The integrated space also catalyzes the Girardian 
function of antebellum nostalgia as a whole; integration pluralizes the geographical owners of 
the public space, forcing the reallocation of power and territory and encouraging latent tension to 
surface, thus threatening community violence. Moreover, integration undermines the symbolic 
symbiosis between physical territory and identity itself, challenging the viability of Julian’s 
internal space (and by extension, his suffering) and forcing the white identity to redefine itself in 
light of conceded geography. The integrated space thus functions as an invitation to struggle with 
hypocrisy and to address the underlying (violent) motivation of racial segregation.  
The liminal space also provides a space where mental barriers between the consciousness 
and the body can be transgressed; by offering elements of novelty alongside elements of 
familiarity, the setting is no longer “unbearable”, but physically compelling. When he boards the 
integrated bus with his mother, Julian first recedes into his “mental bubble” and refuses to 
interact with the physical world around him, instead fantasizing about befriending “better types 
[of black people]...ones that looked like professors or ministers or lawyers” and punishing his 
mother by bringing home “a beautiful suspiciously Negroid woman” (414), or more precisely, 
co-opting black bodies as objects with which to achieve personal prerogatives. He is only “tilted 
out of his fantasy” when he observes a black woman resembling his mother board the bus: “out 
of the dark a large, gaily dressed, sullen-looking colored woman got on...Her bulging figure was 
encased in a green crepe dress and her feet overflowed in red shoes…She carried a mammoth red 
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pocketbook that bulged throughout as if were stuffed with rocks” (415). Encountering a black 
person who defies Julian’s notion of “type” actively “tilt[s]” him out of his “compartment” 
(against his will) and forces him into corporeal experience of the present moment. Though he 
fails to see the woman as a human, focusing on the inadequacy of clothing to contain her 
inhuman “overflow[ing]” feet and the unnatural “mammoth” pocketbook he imagines filled with 
bestial “rocks” instead of money, the woman and her similarity to Julian’s own mother (which he 
at first does not realize) present him with an intermediary between objectified blackness and the 
familiarity of his mother. Instead of being surrounded by an environment he “cannot bear”, the 
woman enters the scene as a half-familiar liminal reference point, allowing him enough security 
to enter the experience of the body. His vivid description of her appearance indicates his forced 
abandonment of the internal compartment of his white identity, instead explicitly engaging with 
the contemporary moment without the lens of prejudice. This abrasive, involuntary confrontation 
with novelty challenges comfortable, preconstructed realities and facilitates the articulation of 
underlying conflict, enabling self-understanding through moral meditation without the 
interaction’s unravelling into violence. Though Julian only ostensibly recognizes his hypocrisy 
after the woman assaults his mother, the integrated geography exclusively enables this 
interaction.  
O’Connor therefore identifies spaces such as the integrated public institution as a liminal 
area integral to ultimate revelation, almost mimicking the notion of a church, or a space where 
god may walk and communicate with the Christian (in so much as god represents a unifying, 
transcendent force). Though racially integrated public institutions constitute the most timely  and 1
1 In 1961, the writing of “Everything That Rises Must Converge” coincided with the Freedom Rides demonstration, 
which tested the Supreme Court decision outlawing segregation in interstate transportation. (Keane)  
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explicit incarnation of this geography, encountering revelatory violence also occurs in 
institutions which facilitate the interaction between previously isolated groups. This phenomenon 
extends through most of the selected stories: Turpin’s conflict with Mary Grace occurs in a clinic 
waiting room populated with diverse clients (489), Sheppard meets Johnson in a reformatory 
(449), Thomas’s mother houses Star after she meets the girl in the municipal jail (386), and 
Calhoun and Mary Elizabeth visit Singleton in a state hospital (442). These liminal areas 
delegate between two conceptual spaces, facilitating transition between the comfortable, 
spiritually stagnant location of the home on one hand, and the radical, transformative unknown 
space, which facilitates rumination on the violence encountered in the liminal space. 
However, the Chardinian model maintains that human complexification and eventual 
convergence are inevitable, unavoidable forces, and O’Connor seems to agree; while the liminal 
space undoubtedly facilitates the revelatory process and even renders it inevitable for its 
inhabitants, it is not necessary for convergence to occur. For instance, convergence inevitably 
confronts even her most isolated character, Thomas, in “The Comforts of Home”. Despite his 
adherence to a philosophy of ethical moderation, Thomas is “not cynical” and sees virtue as “the 
principle of order and the only thing that makes life bearable”, maintaining that his life is “made 
bearable by the fruits of his mother’s saner virtues -- by the well-regulated house she kept and 
the excellent meals she served” (386). The home acts as almost an extension of the body he is 
entitled to, as he describes it as “home, workshop, church, as personal as the shell of a turtle and 
just as necessary” (395). He interprets her charity towards Star as her virtue which “got out of 
hand”, thereby inviting “a sense of devils” into the house, or “denizens with personalities, 
present though not visible” (386). Like Julian’s mental home, Thomas’s personal territory and 
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sense of self intimately converge as a single entity, yet unlike the impenetrable mental bubble, 
invaders threaten Thomas’s interior comfort. His mother’s charity towards Star forces him into a 
type of pseudo-physical kenosis; her presence in his home, if it is to be considered a 
psychological extension of his body, indicates both a physical penetration and a forced 
self-sacrifice of personal territory. While the liminal space urges Julian towards convergence, 
Thomas’s isolation in his home offers nothing familiar or safe with which to mitigate Star’s 
radical foreignness, leading to the relative severity of his eventual violent episode in comparison 
to Julian’s.  As he perceives the imminent destruction or reduction of his power and sense of 
identity, he imagines supernatural, mystical “denizens”, unknowable and insidious, as a 
symptom of Star’s threat to his comfort, referencing a Girardian religion’s mystical justifications 
for violence (that is, if religion deems an entity/scapegoat as inexplicably ‘evil’, it sanctions 
destruction by the community). Formerly held at bay by his mother’s ability to make life 
“bearable”, these “demons” represent the increasing aggressive tension of competition over 
scarce resources -- what Girard would refer to as inevitable mimetic desire O’Connor depicts as 
a type of ethical insecurity as Thomas’s justification for withholding charity steadily crumbles.  
Just as Julian fails to see his own hypocrisy in his objectification of black bodies, Thomas 
similarly fails to recognize the moral failure of his selfish obsession with comfort. Unmolested, 
his home represents the ideal of his dogma and the functioning of his moral justification for a 
selfish life; he can control his mother’s benevolent virtue to ensure their protection against the 
ills of unrestricted virtue and thus not feel obligated towards the less fortunate. However, the loss 
of his immoral father as a ‘regulator’ to balance his mother’s virtue allows her virtue to exceed 
the boundaries of the home and invite “devils”/Star into his home. Thomas’s murder of his 
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mother resembles Julian’s failure to protect his; in the blind service of their ideologies (Thomas’ 
moderation and Julian’s antebellum nostalgia), they unintentionally commit a gross moral failure 
in the effort to defend a justification for comfort, or, more specifically, to avoid confronting their 
own roles in violence. The severity of this failure reveals the severity of the threat that the loss of 
comfort or territory presents to protagonists; O’Connor views the threat to comfort almost as 
severe as the threat to life itself, requiring a reflexive, sometimes murderous counter-attack.  
This association between the loss of territory/comfort and perceived death manifests itself 
in a character’s travel to a radical foreign space, which demands the absolute repudiation of the 
familiar. While both Thomas and Julian play immobilist roles before the inevitable impact of 
convergence, Calhoun and Mary Elizabeth in the later “The Partridge Festival” instead seek out 
and anticipate revelation by visiting the incarcerated Singleton in the state hospital. The two 
travellers imagine their journey in the geographical terms of a gospel: “The boy sat helpless 
while the car, as if of its own volition, turned and headed toward the entrance. The letters Quincy 
State Hospital were cut in a concrete arch which it rolled effortlessly though. ‘Abandon hope all 
ye who enter here,’ the girl murmured” (439). The car’s independent “volition” evokes both the 
inevitable hand of convergence as well as the arbitrary vehicle of death, to which the passengers 
are “helpless” to control, foreshadowing the inevitability of what Calhoun later refers to as 
“some strange tranquility” (440) resulting from his meeting with Singleton. Mary Elizabeth’s 
allusion to Dante Alighieri’s ​Inferno ​also further suggests the pair crosses a mortal threshold in 
meeting with Singleton, both allegorizing death as a stage in the journey towards god. More 
importantly, O’Connor establishes the hospital, a radically foreign environment, as a 
geographical setting in which Calhoun’s “strange tranquility”/“revelation” (440) is finally 
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possible; Calhoun’s crossing into the radical setting enables revelation through its emulation of 
death, representing a voluntary self-emptying and the death of the diffused ego. ‘Radical’ travel, 
so to speak, thus comes to function as a kenotic behavior. Though neither Mary Elizabeth nor 
Calhoun necessarily act altruistically, their symbolic death refers to the death of the 
territory-based self; by repudiating the familiar, they repudiate both comfort and reliance on a 
dogma to justify passive violence. Furthermore, they seek a psychological connection with 
Singleton (misguided or otherwise), as Calhoun literally seeks to emulate him, indicating a 
suspension of the self in order to embody another self, which, though problematically 
misanthropic, nonetheless involves a kenotic element in placing others above the self. 
In addition to showing how the Southern perception of identity and contemporary 
reliance on comfort impedes spiritual growth, O’Connor’s geographical continuum (running 
between the home and radical foreign binaries) critically diagnoses Southern insistence on social 
segregation. Though segregation ontologically impedes the possibility of interpersonal 
convergence and likewise disincentivizes kenotic altruism, it more importantly relies on 
boundaries to operate. Julian’s mother corroborates this idea in her insistence that black people 
“were better off when they were [slaves]”, that “[t]hey should rise, yes, but on their own side of 
the fence” (408). Her fearful insistence on a fence, on the division between the white community 
and the black, othered community intrinsically rejects the possibility of a liminal space and also 
emphasizes the need for territory as a basis for “rising”. While “their own side of the fence” 
refers to a potentially benevolent ‘separate but equal’  racially divided space for the black 2
community, it problematically reinforces hierarchical social stratification based on the primacy 
2For reference, the court case overturning the doctrine of “separate but equal” justification for racial segregation, 
Brown v. Board of Education ​took place in 1954, less than six years before “Everything That Rises Must Converge” 
was written. 
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of land and class. Moreover, by rejecting a liminal space, she denies her own capacity to “rise”, 
or converge, or identify with a greater, more inclusive human family. Her statement conflicts 
with both itself as well as the axiomatic title of the story, “Everything That Rises Must 
Converge”: she fails to see that “rising” ontologically invalidates the utility of a “fence” as they 
cannot contain the risen. In other words, the social emphasis on hierarchy and the individual’s 
materialistic dependence on territory and comfort fundamentally oppose the traditional Christian 
value system and, more importantly, cultivate violence; maintaining boundaries between the 
owned and unowned, what material informs the self and what material is foreign, inhibits 
collective peace and necessarily promotes mimetic desire and, according to Girard, inevitable, 
perpetual victimizations of scapegoats. The title’s editorial imperative, that the risen “must” 
converge implicitly suggests the converse: that those divided by fences do not rise. 
Overall, O’Connor’s secular mapping of the spiritual landscape, not between heaven and 
hell, but between an almost masturbatory personal isolation and a tendency towards radical 
social integration/travel reveals her admiration for Teilhard de Chardin’s convergence 
framework as well as a trepidation concerning the compatibility between not just Southern, but 
American perceptions of identity and the capacity to achieve a post violent state. She 
characterizes a spiritually antagonistic xenophobia intervening in the convergence process; an 
aversion to the novel based on the bloody history of American greed and a subsequent recession 
into the structures that reassure us of our comfort and innocence. Not only does O’Connor’s 
writing betray an anticipation of post-slavery retribution against the white former aristocracy, but 
she criticizes this anxiety as an impediment to ultimate convergence -- that to use this fear, this 
tendency to put up fences as a justification to continue participation in Girardian violence, is an 
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action that indicates a preference for the Kingdom of Violence over the Kingdom of Love. 
Ultimately, O’Connor suggests a fundamental incompatibility between self-imposed isolation 
and the convergence model, maintaining that ultimate convergence transcends the hierarchical 
divisions and the proverbial fence; that those who rise are lifted up by those on the other side.  
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“Unbearable”: Pedagogical Encounters and the Cult of Comfort 
The Book of Job in the Old Testament opens to God praising Job, a pious and very 
prosperous man, for his exemplarity as a Christian when Satan remarks that Job’s wealth and 
fortune alone motivate his devotion and that removing these would lead him denounce God. 
God, in turn, maintains his belief in Job’s unwavering faith and grants Satan permission to 
victimize Job in order to test his strength. God looks on while Satan kills his children, burns his 
son’s house down, and afflicts him with sores and nightmares; his friends advise Job to repudiate 
his God due to his passivity in light of Job’s suffering, but as predicted, he refuses, remaining 
steadfast in his faith. Ultimately, God speaks to the group from a hurricane, praising Job 
lengthily for his virtue and denouncing his friends before bestowing Job with new, increased 
wealth and prosperity. He emphasizes humans’ inability to perceive divine knowledge and 
therefore discredits Job’s comforters as unworthy to give counsel because they incorrectly 
perceive the will of God. Central to this moral dilemma is the question of how a good Christian 
behaves to most effectively please God and how one can most effectively deduce what this 
behavior entails, despite an ostensible inability to access true divine knowledge. Job’s 
exemplarity (which O’Connor explicitly reimagines in “Revelation”) reveals the human need for 
a type of pedagogy to rationalize ideal Christian behavior that in some way addresses the 
universal prevalence of suffering despite a presumably omnipotent God (although, as previously 
noted, the kenotic tradition challenges this notion). However, O’Connor’s portrayals of these 
pedagogical intermediaries, or dogmas, as I will commonly refer to them, often result in a jarring 
violent action that calls into question its functionality. In fact, these dogmas function similarly to 
the role of Girardian religion in their justification of the sacrifice the scapegoat, revealing that the 
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often quotidian, innocuous dogma itself conceals the individual’s culpability in violence. Just as 
the community who participates in the scapegoat mechanism practices the violence its religion 
simultaneously denounces and justifies, O’Connor’s protagonists often remain blind to their 
hypocrisy until the moral comfort the dogma provides is threatened. The violent mechanism is 
activated in light of this threat and the potential for violence inevitably realized, culminating in 
the undeniability of the violent revelation. 
This insistence on a rationalizing intermediary between unknowable divine will and 
ostensibly instinctual hedonistic will is suspiciously acute and urgent in O’Connor’s stories; 
protagonists often attempt to persuade others of their respective dogma but unintentionally reveal 
its violent potential in the process. For example, Thomas’s fervent efforts to “[show]” (383) his 
mother the danger of her charity towards Star result in matricide; Julian’s attempts to “teach” 
(414) his mother racial tolerance lead to her assault; Sheppard’s benevolent attempts to seduce 
Johnson away from Christianity blind him to the struggles of his own son, etc. In fact, almost all 
of O’Connor’s stories are complicated by or center around characters who cite some form of 
suffering as a moral license to interpret the ideal way for others to behave. However, unlike Job’s 
ordeal, this alleged suffering is often emotional rather than physical and fails to impede the 
physical comfort and psychological well-being of the character. I posit that the circumstances 
surrounding these encounters reveal both O’Connor’s rejection that comfort and revelation can 
coexist (rejecting the spiritual superiority of the ascetic, or that arbitrary suffering automatically 
designates sacredness) as well as insisting that ​true ​Christian/convergent behavior must result in 
a net loss (suffering) on behalf of the Christian; as Job’s narrative suggests, O’Connor 
corroborates that only in the absence of any sort of benefit is faith/self-sacrifice notable.  
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The motivation behind moral pedagogy often originates in an understanding of those 
from foreign territories as inherently wrong or in need of correction, indicating that these dogmas 
demand an individual’s exclusive subscription and antagonism toward other dogmas. “The Lame 
Shall Enter First” engages specifically with how the construction of stereotype arises from this 
mandatory exclusivity and ultimately instigates unintentional violence. The pragmatic city-bred 
Sheppard, who refers to Johnson’s religious zeal as “[r]ubbish” and “ignorance” (451), associates 
the his criminal behavior with “boys [that] had been transplanted abruptly from the country to 
the city” (449), emphasized by Johnson’s stereotypically fanatic, backwoods grandfather, who 
leaves his grandson to “bury some Bibles in a cave and take two of different kinds of animals 
and all that” (457). Sheppard, a self-perceived “city” stereotype himself, blames the corruption of 
“the country” for Johnson’s deviance, reducing him to its zealous fanaticism imprinted on a 
tabula rasa. He reduces Johnson to a ​victim​ of the country, interpreting his genuine insidiousness 
as an extension of the “country” prerogative/agenda. He positions his own “city” prerogative in 
opposition to the country’s antagonistic influence; the boy is “ignorant” but teachable; victimized 
by the geography of dark “caves” and bestial, primitivism, but correctable through Sheppard’s 
own oppositional influence. Sheppard’s drive to “save” (474) Johnson from non-empirical 
Christian beliefs ironically connotes an urgency to correct an inherently sinful, ignorant, or 
misdirected “country”. This ostensibly noble but latently dehumanizing prerogative convinces 
Sheppard of the kenotic potential of his own attempts to convert Johnson. It both reinforces 
Sheppard’s confidence in his own altruism, securing his comfort and thus fulfilling his 
ideological contract with the (hypocritical) atheistic ascetic-proselytism to which he subscribes 
as well as reinforces his self-perception as a sacred figure worthy of teaching others the correct 
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way to behave. Despite Johnson’s obvious resistance to Sheppard’s intellectual pursuit, the 
teacher fails to see his own abilities as anything other than successful (merited by the assurance 
of his dogma), which leads to his underestimation of Johnson as an ideological adversary. The 
two are thus reduced to avatars in conflict on behalf of their respective dogmas; by embodying 
stereotypes, Johnson becomes both signified by and a signifier of the country ideology, just as 
Sheppard becomes both an extension and product of the city ideology, reducing their 
pedagogical interaction to a conflict between two immobile actors. Assured by the comfort of his 
dogma and middle-class suburban insulation from the threat of harm, Sheppard fails to anticipate 
the inevitable devolution into violence the aggression of his ideology causes. He realizes neither 
the futility of his efforts to convert Johnson nor the subsequent neglect of his son until he 
discovers Norton’s body, the irrevocable proof of his complicity in violence.  
Inherent in this example is a central tension and negotiation between Sheppard’s desire to 
fulfill his idealized self (a selfless role model for children, a teacher) and the obligation to act in 
accordance with his dogma, the proselytic asceticism that justifies the avoidance of his own 
inadequate son in favor of Johnson, who appears to be a better candidate for his teachings. This 
tension, between the desire to fulfill an idealized version of oneself and the temptation of 
comfort, emerges in most of the selected stories, notably through Calhoun and the tension 
between his nonconformist ideal identity and his prosaic reality, as well as through Thomas and 
the tension between his father’s authoritarianism and an ideal pacifist moderation. This tension is 
similar to the tension between the Girardian community’s appetite for aggression and desire for 
peaceful security; religion, which justifies the release of aggression similarly finds its analog in 
characters’ dogmas. Unlike Girard’s religion, which secures the relative peace of the community 
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and diverts potential infighting to the scapegoat, O’Connor’s dogma only results in violence 
when its moral justification for comfort is threatened, indicating a preference for comfort over 
security. In Sheppard’s case, his ascetic dogma dictates that he must “save” Johnson from his 
religious enthusiasm and show him the “light” of empiricism to reinforce his own identity. 
However, Johnson recognizes the self-interest veiled by Sheppard’s outward charity and seeks to 
expose his own hypocrisy to him, thus threatening the function of the dogma and thereby 
prompting a violent defense. 
This observation calls into question the utility and true altruism of the ascetic tradition. 
O’Connor refers explicitly to Sheppard’s asceticism, sparsely adorning his bedroom with only 
“an acetic-looking iron bed” on the “bare floor”, a desk, and a “heap of Little League 
uniforms...piled in one corner” (455). Considering the intimate relationship between a 
character’s perception of self and their home/personal geography, the contents of Sheppard’s 
room associates him (or rather, his self-perception) with social service and self-denial, concisely 
describing the traditional ascetic. Though explicitly atheist, his secularized asceticism 
nonetheless adheres to the tradition of emulating Christ through charity and self-denial, but 
simultaneously calls into question his motivations; if he repudiates religious sanctity, what does 
self-denial afford him? Consciously, he claims that self-denial and social service help him cope 
with his wife’s death, telling Norton, “‘If you stop thinking about yourself and think about what 
you can do for somebody else...you’ll stop missing your mother” (448).  
However, his aggressive obsession with “saving” Johnson suggests that this apparent 
altruism more accurately functions as a way to establish his own power. Sheppard betrays this 
desperation for power when he tells Johnson, “‘I’m stronger than you are and I’m going to save 
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you. The good will triumph’” but, tellingly, Johnson replies, “‘Not when it ain’t true…[n]ot 
when it ain’t right’” (474). Sheppard thus equates his strength with his ability to “save” Johnson 
and exert his will over him, showing that his asceticism represents not self-sacrifice for others, 
but a means to confirm and exercise his own power. Furthermore, Johnson’s qualification of 
“good” as either right or wrong, true or false, suggests that because Sheppard’s self-interest 
motivates his asceticism, it does not fulfill its kenotic intention and is therefore not “right” nor 
“true” . Though charity ostensibly contributes to the communal good regardless of motivation 3
(self-promotion or altruism alike) O’Connor, through Johnson, argues that true and right 
intention are necessary for the ultimate “triumph” of good, or, to extrapolate, convergence. The 
kenotic tradition maintains that one help others at the expense of the self in order to more closely 
resemble Christ. Read within the context of Teilhard de Chardin and Girard, true kenosis is the 
convergent state of being; in the post-violent reality, kenotic behavior prevails, as it is the 
antithesis of violence and most closely aligns with Christ-like behavior. Further assuming that 
convergence represents a human consolidation with Christ, kenotic behavior must inherently 
involve the prevalence of love ​despite​ suffering and victimization. The “wrongness” of 
Sheppard’s asceticism and, O’Connor suggests, asceticism itself, lies not in his secularity, but in 
his treatment of suffering and charity as tokens to exchange for power and not as a gesture of 
love, or a byproduct of love. The behavioral demands of his dogmatic framework obscure this 
wrongness or falseness in its suggestion that self-denial through the sharing of resources itself 
constitutes love. In fact, his reliance on the ascetic dogma ​inhibits​ his capacity for love; only 
after Johnson finally rejects Sheppard’s assistance when he is arrested, and Sheppard realizes his 
3 The language of “truth” and “goodness” has been argued by Michael Mears Bruner’s ​A Subversive Gospel​ to refer 
to the Platonic transcendentals of beauty, goodness, and truth.  
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incidental violence towards Norton does he experience a “rush of agonizing love...like a 
transfusion of life” (481-2). O’Connor thus presents asceticism, and by extension, other dogmas 
that promote moral comfort, as a barrier to accessing the true kenotic state. The insistence on 
charity and self-denial focuses on the superficial traits of Christ and distracts from his most 
primary characteristic, radical love. 
Problematically, references to hagiographical or biblical ascetics nonetheless litter the 
stories as foils to their respective protagonists, showing a problematic cultural emphasis on the 
value of suffering. In both “The Comforts of Home” and “Everything that Rises Must 
Converge”, the protagonist engages explicitly with a hagiographical figure: Thomas justifies 
abstaining from an “excess of virtue” (385) because “if Antony of Egypt  had stayed at home and 4
attended to his sister, no devils would have plagued him” (386), while Julian compares himself 
to Saint Sebastian  waiting for “the arrows to begin piercing him” (405) before accompanying 5
his mother to her reducing class. In fact, this anticipation of suffering actively alienates the two 
protagonists from corporeal experience and by extension, their respective pupils. O’Connor 
repeatedly describes Thomas’s environment as “unbearable” and “unendurable” (385-7, 390, 
395, “insufferable” (396)) and he displaces his sexual frustration into intellectual masturbation, 
“vigorously” (393) reading alone in his office attempting to quell “a disturbance in the depths of 
his being, somewhere out of the reach of his power of analysis” (393). Julian, too, escapes into 
“the inner compartment of his mind” when he can not “bear to be a part of what was going on 
around him” (411). Both characters present an extreme reluctance to suffering, or even corporeal 
experience, either attempting to “analyze” psychic discomfort from a place of hiding or 
4 ​Antony of Egypt notoriously withdrew from society and battled “temptations” from the devil. (Petruzzello “St. 
Antony of Egypt”) 
5 Saint Sebastian, a martyred saint, was murdered after converting Roman soldiers. (Petruzzello “Saint Sebastian”) 
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collapsing into their own mind as a way to escape it. They demand that for reality to be 
“bearable”, it must yield to fit the rules of their dogmatic understandings and therefore be free 
from unrationalized suffering. Thomas’s mother must reduce her virtue or receive a punishment 
in magnitude equal to her virtue just as Julian’s mother must inevitably bend to progressivism 
and relinquish antebellum, white ideology; the good must meet evil, progressivism must 
progress, and the world must make sense and become “bearable” and explainable. This extreme 
aversion to suffering shows a marked misunderstanding of the existence of violence itself -- the 
only way with which they can engage with the foreign notion of discomfort is through references 
to remote hagiographical stories until they witness it firsthand. Thomas understands suffering as 
part of a natural mechanism that offsets virtue to keep nature in equilibrium while Julian 
perceives that he actively suffers while “enduring” his mother. Both further regard suffering as 
an indication of virtue or a sign of moral superiority.  
However, read through the lenses of kenotic thought and the notion of Chardinian 
diminishment, this insulation from discomfort foretells a spiritual stagnation and ultimate 
inability to access revelation or convergence; kenosis demands suffering (or, at least, 
self-sacrifice), while Teilhard de Chardin’s theories posit that struggling with one’s physical and 
mental limitations (diminishment) brings one closer to convergence. Both perspectives 
emphasize the role of the physical body as a critical tool of gaining spiritual knowledge. By 
refusing to respond to uncontrollable physical cues (such as Thomas’ arousal) or escaping from 
the contemporary moment, both protagonists remain insulated from the opportunity to struggle 
and gain spiritual knowledge, rendering them Chardinian immobilists. More urgently, Girard’s 
theory suggests that since both misunderstand and remind blind to violence, they lack the ability 
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to either repudiate or embrace it -- this obsessive subscription to constant comfort not only 
facilitates complicity to violence around them but also predisposes them to the direct 
commission of violence in defense of their comfort (as is seen in Thomas’ murder of his mother). 
In fact, Girard would argue that this commission of violence is imminent as tension from innate 
mimetic desire builds, which contradicts Teilhard de Chardin’s qualification of a relatively 
benign, if unfortunate immobilist. O’Connor’s portrayals reveal a hybrid perspective -- she 
suggests the inevitability of a violent event not as a result of mimetic desire, but rather due to 
resistance to the inevitability of complexification, which threatens comfort, and by extension, the 
home. These violent events force spiritual learning in the form of Girardian revelation and by 
definition, establish a tangible connection with the body and mortality. O’Connor therefore 
embraces the tradition of using suffering as a pedagogical tool, but not in the conventional image 
of a saint -- considering the ease with which Julian perceives suffering, she more accurately 
qualifies pedagogical suffering as necessarily physical and extrinsic.  
While her references to the suffering of saints contrasts with the domestic discomfort of 
Julian and Thomas, a direct reference to the suffering of Job shows a much simpler interpretation 
of divine intent, or how a Christian should ideally behave based not on an Old Testament jealous 
God, but on the love of Christ. While Turpin rests at home after Mary Grace assaults her in the 
office, she  
“raise[s] her first and [makes] a small stabbing motion over her chest as if she was 
defending her innocence to invisible guests who were like the comforters of Job, 
reasonable-seeming but wrong” (503).  
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O’Connor ironically inverts the biblical situation; instead of accepting suffering and defending 
the fickle actions or inactions of God to others (as Job notoriously does), Turpin indignantly, 
“stabbing” with her fist, asserts her “innocence” and the injustice of her suffering. Unlike the 
obedient Job, she furiously demands that God explain her punishment despite the original story’s 
insistence that divine knowledge is unknowable. Her embodiment of a subverted Job reveals her 
rejection of the pedagogical value of Job’s suffering; she does not need to be ‘taught’, for she is 
saved, nor does suffering mark her favor in God’s eyes. However, Turpin’s experience departs 
singularly from Julian and Thomas’s in her experience of violence; the epistemological 
contradiction between her self-decided salvation and her subjection to what she interprets as 
divine punishment forces her to accept either an absent, fickle god, or her spiritual need for 
punishment. Though Turpin struggles to rationalize the suffering she experiences within an 
understanding of suffering as either punitive or a mark of the damned, her injury forces her to 
turn to God to teach her, asking, “How am I a hog and me both? How am I saved and from hell 
too?” (506). Instead of comparing herself to a damned soul, or even a human member of the 
“inferior” groups she refers to (491), she assumes that damnation (or membership in “inferior” 
groups) indicates a lack of humanity and like her pigs, subject to the will of the saved, just as 
humans are subject to the arbitrary and abusive will of their hierarchical superior, God. 
By allowing Mary Grace to transgress the boundaries of the hierarchy, Turpin’s 
perception of God reveals the violence of her deterministic dogma and implicates her in 
culpability. She challenges God, saying, “Call me a wart hog from hell. Put that bottom rail on 
top. There’ll still be a top and bottom!” (507). “Putting the bottom rail on top” refers to a Civil 
War anecdote in which an escaped slave in the Union army encounters his former Confederate 
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slave master and tells him the ‘bottom rail is on top this time’, referring to their inverted power 
dynamic. However, the image also evokes Acts 17:6 and the concept of the Jews (a political 
minority) eventually securing a power inversion over their oppressors, emphasizing tension 
between the Christian narrative and the Southern political narrative. In other words, the 
Confederate elite cannot inherit the Christian narrative of a just but oppressed people if they 
simultaneously admit their political advantage of being on ‘top’ of the ‘bottom rail’. Turpin’s 
deterministic dogma allows her to justify the white South’s political role as simultaneously 
oppressor and Christian in parallel narratives because God ultimately orchestrates and delegates 
all suffering. To resolve this political ambiguity, Turpin insists on the need to preserve the 
“traditional” institution of hierarchy as a divinely-created social model -- emulating on a Job-like 
silent obedience of divine omnipotence. Mary Grace’s transgression against her hierarchical 
place challenges the conservative  justification for slavery; if pre-bellum slavery was, in fact, not 6
an arbitrary manifestation of Job-like suffering, but a greed-driven moral atrocity, a 
Mary-Grace-like sin against the ‘natural’ order of things, Turpin loses the moral reference points 
separating the white from the black, bestial from the human, the “wart hog” from the self 
because she is directly implicated in the collective sin. “How am I a hog and me both?” (506) she 
asks, or, how can she be of the bestial tribe of sin and simultaneously saved? Her perpetuation of 
hierarchy necessarily denotes her bestial selfishness, and her assault confirms it; if God has the 
power to spare her from suffering at the hands of Mary Grace, he had the power to spare slaves 
from suffering at the hands of white slave-owners. God’s inaction thus equates her with the 
“hogs”, undermining the foundation of her dogma.  
6 The language of this conservativism evokes the language of the New Conservatives, a group of writers who 
popularized the concept of traditionalist conservativism, which emphasized the importance of tradition over social 
change. (Henrie) 
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In Turpin’s case, suffering directly challenges the basis of her dogma and prompts her to 
accept unconditional love as the epitome of divine knowledge; the experience of suffering 
literally teaches her of her vulnerability to suffering. In the book of Job, God demonstrates the 
immensity of his power to destroy and to create, repudiating the audacity of the comforters to 
suggest deviance and denying their ability to discern his motives. However, Turpin’s God freely 
addresses her demands, ostensibly giving her a vision of his divine answer, depicting a God who 
is not only uninterested in behavior or social class (showing her “whole companies” of different 
social castes “rumbling toward heaven” simultaneously (508)), but who embraces her and shows 
her unconditional favor despite her ostensible implication in sin. This inclusive image replaces 
the hurricane, substituting radical tolerance for punitive power. All are saved; no sinners burn. 
Suffering thus, in this case, represents not a way to please God nor to necessarily understand the 
machinations of God, but an event that forces the sufferer to acknowledge that radical love is the 
only antagonist to violence, and that to act in the image of God is to similarly love radically.  
Ultimately, O’Connor embraces extrinsic physical suffering as the ideal pedagogical 
method for acquiring divine knowledge due to its absolute negation of love. Like the Girardian 
decision for or against the Kingdom of Violence, one must understand their own complicity in 
both violence and suffering and their own ability to turn away from it. By recapitulating violence 
as an exclusively human decision from which comfort is derived, O’Connor forces the individual 
to address their own complicity in selfishness; truth and comfort are incompatible and the latter 
must be relinquished to access the former. She further diagnoses the destructive role of dogmatic 
and cultural pedagogy on the understanding of divine intent. Neither suffering nor its absence, 
she argues, can impart wisdom, spiritual superiority or salvation without the removal of comfort. 
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However, the Girardian function of dogma, in place of religion, obscures an individual’s ability 
to experience moral discomfort due to the individual’s reliance upon comfort and aversion to 
suffering. She thus recapitulates the plight of spirituality not as a Catholic balancing act of 
mitigating sin with good works, nor an anxious Protestant denial of indulgence, but a simple, 
truly kenotic, Christ-like, radical embrace of the entire community and the audacity to repudiate 
the familiar in order to embrace the unknown. 
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Diminishment and Disfigurement: The Public Role of the Sacred Sinner 
Although often radical instigators of violence, antagonists such as Singleton, Star, and 
Johnson employ a unique ability to incite Christian revelation in their respective misguided 
protagonists. Compellingly, these characters all bear signs of physical or mental Chardianian 
diminishment, from Star’s alleged nymphomania to Johnson’s club foot; these marks of suffering 
crucially inform their unique ability to both see a protagonist’s hypocrisy and, albeit often 
unknowingly, inspire a confrontation with the Girardian revelation of violence. Their 
extraordinary relationship with diminishment ostensibly accounts for this psychic clarity, which, 
by extension, also suggests their increased proximity to convergence despite their markedly 
violent, antagonistic behavior. O’Connor’s discussion of the outsider or outcast, marked by 
extreme physical diminishment or disfigurement suggest that she envisions them on one hand 
fulfilling the role of a priest or counsellor in guiding the protagonist to enlightenment, and on the 
other, a physical reminder of the limits of the flesh, a living memento mori. Contrasted with the 
image of the insular ascetic which also participates within the tradition of attributing suffering 
with sacredness or privilege in the eyes of God, O’Connor thus imagines a crucial place for these 
outsiders within her contemporary interpretation of Christianity which combines an anticipated 
Girardian understanding of the scapegoat with the kenotic legacy’s tradition of equating 
suffering with a means of achieving divine knowledge or understanding. 
O’Connor imbues her outcasts with almost supernatural, intense traits to both distinguish 
them from the hypocrisy of ascetic tropes such as Sheppard or symbolic suffering like Julian’s, 
and to portray their reception as radically discordant with the social environment. When 
Sheppard meets him in the reformatory, Johnson’s “thin dark hair hung...fiercely like an old 
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man[’]s” despite his youth and shows “fanatic intelligence” (449), indicating a mysterious 
wisdom both inaccessible to Sheppard due to his youth yet paradoxically founded on the lived 
experience of age. Despite his youth, Johnson is not pedantic, but “intelligent” like an old man; 
he is also, however, described as “fierce” and “fanatic” which ostensibly refer to country 
stereotypes but more importantly indicate a pointed dangerousness. Moreover, the narrator also 
describes his “monstrous” (450) club foot with threatening, almost inhuman connotation, noting 
“the end of an empty sock protruded [from the brace] like a gray tongue from a severed head” 
and that it is “raised always to [Johnson’s] knee like a weapon ready for use” (450). These details 
demand attention, suggested when Sheppard’s “eyes [drop] involuntarily to the foot”, the “black 
deformed mass swell[s] before his eyes” (450). These unsettling details both alert the reader to 
the imminent threat Johnson poses to Sheppard’s comfort and also identifies the foot’s being 
seen as a source of kenotic violence -- its ability to physically expand under Sheppard’s gaze 
indicates its corroboration of Johnson’s radical, almost supernatural novelty, as it represents the 
source of his exile from the sphere of comfort. Despite Sheppard’s optimistic insistence that 
Johnson can and should belong in his own domestic world of comfort and excess, his reception 
of the foot as a symbol intimately related with death, entropy, and monstrosity suggests that 
Johnson’s deformity (to use O’Connor’s vocabulary) negates his ability to fully enter the cult of 
comfort.  
Extreme psychological diminishment also marks an antagonist’s exile from the domestic 
sphere and engages the protagonist’s attention in a similar manner. The narrator describes Star’s 
“psychopathic personality” as “not insane enough for the asylum, not criminal enough for the 
jail, not stable enough for society” (388), and Thomas regards it as “the most unendurable form 
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of innocence” (390). Her psychological diminishment notably disconnects her from geography -- 
not only is Thomas unable to realistically place her in any physical location, but he finds 
rumination on this radical homelessness “unendurable”, especially in contrast to his own 
vice-like obsession with his own comfort. Resonating again in this failure to empathize with Star 
is the concept of “enduring” or “bearing” as a kenotic necessity; even though he physically does 
not experience Star’s diminishment, it still affects him deeply and causes him to avoid her. He 
cannot bear, even mentally, to displace his dogmatic comfort to extend empathy towards her, as 
it would inherently suggest a problem with moderation: if Star, who is ostensibly incapable of 
distinguishing virtue from vice, only experiences misfortune, then why does her suffering 
prevail? Her extreme disenfranchisement also threatens the “moderate” status of his comfort, 
suggesting that instead of keeping him safe from Saint Antony’s “demons”, what he deems to be 
a humble emotional reliance on his home represents a non-virtuous indulgence. The discomfort 
of “enduring” empathy signifies both an invitation to struggle with diminishment and attain 
virtue as well as a direct threat to his dogmatic system.  
Though the tradition of kenosis emphasizes personal suffering as a way to increase virtue, 
its intersection with Girard’s theory problematizes the connection between suffering and 
sacredness or rather, between sacredness and virtue. Girard’s scapegoat attains the sacred state 
by being victimized to ensure the peace of the broader community -- therefore the community 
delegates virtue solely based on the comparatively unvirtuous outcome of its own actions. 
Kenotic discourse, on the other hand, would sustain that the process of being sacrificed or 
experiencing violence builds virtue within the individual, given their experience of an event that 
resembles Christ’s persecution, but more specifically, that such unresponsive endurance is a 
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radical expression of selflessness. New Testament scripture, especially the writings of Paul 
corroborates this perspective of glorifying the sufferer through its frequent esteeming of the 
“meek” over the powerful and Christ’s attentions to the blind and disenfranchised in contrast to 
the rich or powerful . However, this perspective also inspires ambiguity around O’Connor’s 7
deformed figures, or, as Johnson refers to himself, the lame, who ostensibly do not suffer for the 
good of the community, but who are inherently victimized to no one’s benefit. In this case, these 
individuals fulfill kenosis’s method for attaining divine knowledge, but not Girard’s (insomuch 
as sacredness assumes a state of virtuousness); because they do not suffer for the sake of the 
community, they are unlikely to be considered sacred. O’Connor certainly uses suffering, in the 
form of violence, as a means to jar characters into revelation, which follows the kenotic 
perspective but also rejects suffering as an automatic indicator of virtue, at least in the traditional 
sense of the word. The rampant participation of Star and Johnson in violence and other sin 
clearly either complicate a traditional sense of virtue or indicate just the opposite: that those who 
chronically suffer fail to perceive or respect the ethical boundaries virtue requires.  
Chardinian diminishment further complicates this notion, as it identifies struggling with 
misfortune as the potential to approach the convergent state, which the lame are inevitably 
inclined to do despite their violent inclinations. O’Connor also takes this perspective into 
consideration in her construction of this trope but emphasizes individual volition as a crucial 
limiter on this capacity; the constant diminishment of the lame indicates their lack of a need for 
the revelation of violence and their ability to clearly perceive the function of dogmatic analogs 
for Girardian religion. For instance, Johnson immediately identifies Sheppard’s self-interest in 
7 As shown through such aphorisms as “It is easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man 
to enter the kingdom of God.” (Mark 10:25) 
 
Wilson 46 
his charity, while Star perceives Thomas’ comfort as symptom of his sexual repression. 
However, choosing the post-violent state is a matter of incentive; because the lame will 
ostensibly never stop suffering and permanently be exiled from the cult of comfort regardless, 
convergence would hold little value. In sum, the fact that O’Connor’s lame uniquely exist 
outside of the Girardian system combined with the clarity gleaned from their suffering put them 
in a unique position to be able to influence revelation in others. Furthermore, this indication 
recapitulates virtue (from a kenotic sense) as not a behavioral inclination towards pacifism or 
selflessness, per se, but an ability to understand human motivation and ostensibly the resulting 
inclination to expose hypocrisy. The community still perceives sufferers as sacred due to their 
radicality and repudiation of comfort, but mistakenly attribute this sacredness to a spiritual 
courageousness to endure misfortune.  
Beyond symbolically challenging the comfort and hypocrisy of their respective 
protagonists, lame antagonists also force characters around them into both self-sacrifice and a 
state of physical engagement, drawing a distinction between spiritual rumination involving 
involuntary physical experience, a kenotic function which also guides the protagonist towards 
the cusp of revelation, and spiritual rumination without the presence of a physical impetus, 
which, while ostensibly worthwhile, fails to increase understanding. Star’s radicality, for 
example, forces Thomas into corporeal experience; after she “violate[es]” (395) his home, his 
“flushed face ha[s] a constant look of stunned outrage”, as he smells her “small tragic 
spearmint-flavored sighs”, and perceives that she “appear[s] to adore [his] repugnance to her” 
and intentionally “draw[s] it out of him...as if it added delectably to her martyrdom” (395). Star 
“draws out” Thomas’ consciousness of his body which forces him to involuntarily experience 
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her “spearmint-flavored sighs” and the “flush[ing]” of his face. Like Julian’s unconscious “tilt” 
out of his mental compartment , O’Connor describes Thomas’s “constant look of stunned 8
outrage” in the passive voice, obscuring the identities of the tilter and the giver of outrage, 
characterizing his experience as uncontrollable, overwhelming, and outwardly attributed to an 
absent, ostensibly spiritual actor. The body’s reflexive reactions provide an urgency to struggle 
with and rationalize the apparent reaction lest lose control over the body. These reactions evoke 
the Girardian dysfunction of mimetic desire; Thomas’s “repugnance”, resembles the aggression 
caused by mimetic desire, similarly tempting him into violence to expend this tension.  
Predictably, he fails to meaningfully engage with this experience, instead focusing on his 
own victimization over the discomfort it affords him with rather than questioning the source or 
meaning of this involuntary “outrage”, or “enduring”, which would ostensibly lead him to 
revelation and reveal the failure of virtue in his moderation dogma. By refusing to challenge his 
own beliefs and remaining immobile to the Girardian revelation, Thomas chooses to indulge the 
bestial drive of aggression when his comfort is threatened, only discovering the latent violence of 
his decision after he kills his mother. Crucially, Star’s radical physical body activates the bestial 
consciousness and makes the need to regain control urgent and jarring, suggesting that 
encountering the lame provides a vicarious diminishment to the community, thus eliminating the 
explicit need for violence to induce revelation. Though Thomas admittedly fails to experience 
revelation in time to anticipate the violent event, this failure shows O’Connor’s explicit 
8 I would like to point out that this interpretation points out a particularly problematic aspect to O’Connor’s view of 
diminishment. If, like Star’s diminishment “tilts” Thomas into physical experience, it follows that the black woman 
Julian encounters on the bus experiences diminishment as a result of her blackness. The uncomfortable implication 
is that O’Connor may have seen blackness as a diminishment comparable to physical or psychological disability, a 
fact which I would like to point out but leave to the reader to evaluate. Clearly, this problem demands a separate 
analysis in its own right.  
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subscription to the evolutionary connotation of Teilhard de Chardin’s theories. That is, Star 
represents the changing, complexifying environment Thomas must adapt to, lest be tragically 
overlooked by natural selection and, by extension, fail to converge.  
In addition to providing a physical, nonviolent, impetus for revelation, lameness also 
represents an important foil to the image of obesity stemming from an indulgent lifestyle. 
Though the lame experience perpetual diminishment, the obese in O’Connor’s stories 
(specifically Julian’s mother and Turpin) turn away from this diminishment and instead 
participate in expansion of the self (antithetical to an emptying or sacrificing of the self) through 
an excess of comfort. Turpin, whose chair “[holds] her tight as a corset” claims “I wish I could 
reduce...but me I just look at something good to eat and I gain some weight” (489-90). This 
reluctance to lose weight resembles Thomas’s insistence on not being able to “endure” sharing 
his home with Star and exhibits a similar reluctance to resolve an issue that does not pose an 
immediate threat. Or more specifically, it exhibits a reluctance to conceptualize weight as a 
symptom of a problematic appetite. Like Thomas’s repugnance, both sources of diminishment 
fail to be realized as potential sources of spiritual growth; both characters “wish” they could cast 
off their respective diminishments, but reluctant to sacrifice comfort, the diminishments become 
burdens instead of badges of strength or sanctification. These reactions indicate the prevalence of 
the bestial appetite over rationality and self-control, anticipating Turpin’s later designation as “a 
wart hog from hell” (505). Moreover, her weight correlates directly to her extraordinary 
insulation from suffering, the severity of which is humorously portrayed through her attribution 
of her assault to the suffering of Job, (discussed in part two) shown through her anticipation of 
even more suffering (on the way home, she “would not have been startled to see a burnt wound 
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between two blackened chimneys”  (502)). However, most notable in this portrayal of Turpin’s 9
neglected diminishment is the extreme lack of incentive to grow towards convergence and the 
implication that the tension between her acute sensitivity to suffering and her belief that she does 
not deserve to experience it will grow to the point in which she will go to extreme, violent 
lengths to safeguard her comfort, as Thomas does. This threat carries particular insidiousness 
given her overt commentary over the inferiority of certain racial and social groups and the 
presumed inevitability of convergence (and by extension, a potential victim).  
This threat is realized in Singleton, whose main diminishment manifests as his 
immobilism and an obvious decision to choose the Girardian Kingdom of Violence, repudiating 
convergence. A perceived “Christ-figure” (435) to Mary Elizabeth and Calhoun, and to whom 
the latter regards as the “light of...purity” in contrast to Calhoun’s own “doubleness” (424), 
Singleton foreshadows Calhoun’s propensity for violence; by seeing the murderer as a more 
perfect version of himself, Calhoun glorifies violence, perceiving it as an symbol of 
uncompromising individuality. Singleton not only threatens social harmony with his violence, 
but also threatens the function of aristocratic Southern culture: the town barber describes him as 
wealthy, but “too big a skinflint to have his hair cut”, “half...foreign”, and the dubious product of 
one of the Singleton women’s “nine-month vacation” but the last of his line (430-1). From the 
community’s perspective, Singleton epitomizes American-Gothic decay; his perhaps genetically 
transmitted derangement taken into consideration with the dubiousness of his lineage connote a 
Faulkner-esque incest anxiety, while either his “foreign” nature or the internal decay of the noble 
line reflect his alien political and spiritual irresponsibility. Singleton inherits Southern wealth but 
9 One of Job’s first misfortunes is the burning of his son’s house, indicating the loss of his children. 
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neglects the Southern paternalistic tradition by refusing to patronize local business as well as 
failing to adhere to Catholic mores, challenging the capacity of cultural aristocracy or ‘tradition’ 
to uphold moral community values. O’Connor thus deploys him as a symbol for physical and 
spiritual inertia and stagnation and from a political perspective, the failure of unadaptable 
traditions  to promote social harmony. Calhoun’s attraction to Singleton, though tempered with 10
prosaic irony, presents a very present and insidious threat to both Southern culture and peaceful 
social functioning; the “revelation” Calhoun anticipates more accurately describes his attraction 
to violence itself revealed to him only through interaction with the violent.  
O’Connor’s “disfigured” antagonists thus serve imperative functions in her reimagination 
of the convergence model. They often show protagonists the violent consequences of their 
idealizations by counterexample, at times even implicating them directly in such violence, as 
Johnson does to Sheppard, or providing a vicarious diminishment by challenging the established 
comfort of a potential immobilist. The antagonists’ chronic, physically recognizable 
diminishment exclusively allows them this ability due to both the sacred status granted them by 
their radical presentation of human suffering as well as their inherent exile from the possibility of 
comfort, which mimics Girardian mimetic desire in its cyclical inspiration of tension and its 
function as a precursor to violence. O’Connor diagnoses a human disconnection with the body in 
her social moment as the isolating effects of comfort disincentivize interactions within the 
community, especially among diverse social groups; this resulting isolation from the traditional 
community inspires the need for dogma to justify the undeniable suffering of remote, 
contemporary scapegoats. The “lame” figures ultimately contribute to O’Connor’s optimistic 
10 This discussion of traditional Southern culture could also refer to the discourse of the New Conservatives. 
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interpretation of the evolutionary future of a converging humanity because they crucially 
introduce the possibility of attaining revelation without the need for physical violence. She 
deploys these antagonists like prophets of a corollary to the Gospel, foretelling not good news, 
per se, but the opportunity to adapt and transcend through a radically accessible vicarious 
kenosis.  
 
  
 
Wilson 52 
The Future of Violence and Revelatory Evolution 
In light of the ultimately optimistic theories of Girard and Teilhard de Chardin, the 
immense amount of misfortune and tragedy in O’Connor’s body of work begs the question: if the 
Girardian revelation is ultimately a constructive force-- that is, in its ability to bring us closer to 
the convergent state --then why do her characters require violence as a condition for revelation, 
even with the presence of a “lame” intermediary? Convergence, as O’Connor interprets it, seems 
to be a zero-sum game; if violence is ​necessary​ for the elimination of violence itself, can it ever 
truly be eliminated? Must Sheppard lose his son before he realizes his hand in harming him, just 
as Julian and Thomas must lose their mothers? In broader terms, does convergence itself demand 
a steady supply of blood? Read in isolation, these three stories suggest a certain evolutionary 
brutality to convergence; the revelation will always come too late to intervene in the inevitable 
violent act. However, “Revelation” and “The Partridge Festival” depict two endings that diverge 
from O’Connor’s signature violence, which suggests a final theological pivoting in the last of her 
fiction. Moreover, the motifs of sight and vision, especially seeing oneself, play an increasingly 
central role in narrative revelations, suggesting that the corporeal experience of visual 
recognition plays an essential role in the revelatory mechanism.  
O’Connor’s use of sight and seeing varies widely in these final stories. In the earlier 
“Everything That Rises Must Converge”, verbs and nouns referring to sight and seeing 
overwhelmingly drive the action forward while Julian rides the bus; for example, when the black 
woman who resembles Julian’s mother boards the bus: 
“He ​saw ​his mother’s face change as the woman settled herself next to him and he 
realized with satisfaction that this was more objectionable to her than it was to him. Her 
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face ​seemed almost gray ​and there was a ​look ​of dull recognition in her ​eyes​, as if 
suddenly she had sickened at some awful confrontation. Julian ​saw​...” (415 my emphasis) 
The narration leans heavily on seeing and eyes, especially watching from within Julian’s “mental 
bubble”; “see”, “look” and “looked” account for the most frequently used verbs in the narrative 
besides the passive voice and “going”, accounting for 42 occurrences together (this figure 
excludes other forms of these verbs such as saw, looking, etc.). The almost subconscious fixation 
on the passive act of sight contrasts starkly with the final scene of the story in which his mother’s 
eye actively “remain[s] fixed on him, rake[s] his face…[finds] nothing, and close[s]” after which 
he runs for help as the darkness blinds him, or the “tide of darkness seemed to sweep him back to 
her, postponing from moment to moment his entry into the world of guilt and sorrow” (420). 
Counterintuitively, Julian ​loses​ his sight as a result of his revelation. The recognition of his own 
guilt in his mother’s assault marks a fall, a permanent expulsion from the world of sight into to 
“the world of guilt and sorrow”, suggesting that despite his Girardian revelation of violence and 
his subsequent potential for convergence, this is not the proverbial ‘happy fall’, but a permanent, 
immersive loss of clarity. O’Connor uses the verb forms of ‘sight’ and ‘seeing’ almost 
interchangeably with the passive voice, suggesting Julian’s pre-revelation, passive “sight”,  or 
rather, his failure to intervene on his mother’s behalf constitutes a flawed, false, or immoral 
manner of seeing, one that is presented as a contrast to his active, vivid description of his 
mother’s foil on the bus.  
  In later stories, protagonists perceive their own physical image in respective antagonists, 
such as in “The Lame Shall Enter First”, when Sheppard insists on his ability and renewed will 
to “save” Johnson and Johnson’s violent repudiation of such salvation: “The boy’s eyes were like 
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distorting mirrors in which he saw himself made hideous and grotesque” (474). Sheppard’s 
self-recognition refers not to empathy with Johnson so much as a warning of what he will 
become if he fails to recognize his passive and complicit role in Johnson’s violence, but he fails 
to understand the full gravity of the experience, interpreting it instead as a “distortion” or 
“grotesque”. These earlier stories diagnose a problem with spiritual sight and an inability to see 
oneself clearly which stems from a character’s resistance to hypocrisy -- Julian’s self-perception 
as a precocious victim and Sheppard’s self-perception as a self-sacrificing ascetic obscure the 
selfishness of these pursuits. Their inability to recognize the ironic, self-serving behavior in their 
cruelty or in their attempts to control others (Julian’s mother and Johnson, respectively) reveals 
this sustained ‘blindness’. Violence often attempts to bridge the disconnect between the ideal self 
and the actual self without sacrificing a character’s personal comfort, alienating the hypocrites 
from their own hypocrisy. 
However, “The Partridge Festival” and “Revelation” diverge significantly from 
O’Connor’s tradition of sight. In the former, Calhoun’s revelation consists of the act of looking 
itself, though at Mary Elizabeth:  
“They sat silently, looking at nothing until finally they turned and looked at each other. 
There each saw at once the likeness of their kinsman and flinched. They looked away and 
then back, as if with concentration they might find a more tolerable image...Round, 
innocent, undistinguished as an iron link, [Mary Elizabeth’s face] was the face whose gift 
of life had pushed straight forward to the future to raise festival after festival.” (443-4) 
They mutually see their “kinsman”, Singleton, (whom they pretended to be related to to in order 
to visit), in the faces of one another, finally identifying their deification of him as a morbid form 
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of blindness and a dangerous propensity towards committing comparable violence themselves. 
Calhoun initially seeks Singleton out to cure himself of hypocrisy; although he describes his 
“real self” as “the rebel-artist-mystic” (424), he enjoys the prosaic task of selling appliances (he 
describes his own “guilt, for his doubleness, his shadow…in the light of Singleton’s purity” 
(424)). The pair’s mutual recognition of “the likeness of their kinsman” in one another denotes 
the ostensible success of Calhoun’s purification; that is, he becomes aware of his power to follow 
Singleton and become a “pure” version of his idealized self, recognizing his capacity to 
“become” Singleton. However, he finds the concept intolerable, as his experience exposes him to 
the violence necessary in becoming his idealized “rebel-artist-mystic”; this moment, in which he 
recognizes himself and his potential for purity, he makes the Girardian decision towards the 
Kingdom of Love, turning towards Mary Elizabeth and the “gift of life” despite her 
“undistinguished” and prosaic destiny. Crucially, Calhoun is ​not​ “pure”; he shows no signs of 
necessarily repudiating his identity as a rebel. Rather, the most transformative aspect of his 
revelation instead lies in his acceptance of his own hypocrisy -- the ability to defy the cultural 
insistence on a consistent (usually geography-based) identity and instead accept personal 
imperfection. His repudiation of violence (in rejecting the Christ-image of Singleton) necessarily 
involves accepting the convergence of both of his selves, the prosaic and the rebel, in a sort of 
radical self-love.  
While the final revelation in “The Partridge Festival” indicates an uncharacteristic 
optimism, “Revelation” reveals a more chilling attitude towards the efficacy of revelation. 
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Intriguingly, and novel in this selection of O’Connor’s stories , Turpin’s revelation consists of 11
an explicitly divine vision:  
“A visionary light settled in her eyes. She saw the streak as a vast swinging bridge 
extending upward from the earth through a field of living fire. Upon it a vast horde of 
souls were rumbling toward heaven. There were whole companies of white-trash, clean 
for the first time in their lives, and bands of black [people] in white robes, and battalions 
of freaks and lunatics...And bringing up the end of the procession was a tribe of people 
whom she recognized at once as those who, like herself and Claud, had always had a little 
of everything and the God-given wit to use it right...They alone were on key. Yet she 
could see by their shocked and altered faces that even their virtues were being burned 
away. She lowered her hands and gripped the rail of the hog pen, her eyes small but fixed 
unblinkingly on what lay ahead...she remained where she was, immobile.” (509)  
Read in comparison with the book of Job, this image correlates to the whirlwind from which God 
confronts Job, ostensibly as a display of his unimaginable power (and by extension, his 
unimaginable will) (Job 38.1 ​The New Oxford Annotated Bible​). O’Connor’s reimagination of 
this scene through Turpin’s revelation clearly disposes of the domineering, Old Testament God 
authority in preference for the laissez-faire, kenotic God of the Gospel, or more accurately, of 
convergence. Instead of demonstrating his power to punish, God demonstrates his radical 
capacity for love, welcoming the inclusive “vast horde”, treasuring the “trash” in white robes and 
embracing the “battalions” of “freaks and lunatics”. Moreover, this vision also differs from other 
revelations in its penetrative quality; the narrator describes the vision physically entering 
11 Another notable example of a character experiencing a divine vision and which may serve as a valuable 
comparison appears in “Parker’s Back” in ​Everything That Rises Must Converge​. 
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Turpin’s eyes, “settl[ing]” in contrast to Calhoun’s active looking or Julian’s blinding, 
suggesting that the vision blinds nor awakens her, foreshadowing the lack of transformative 
potential. However, unlike Calhoun, Turpin turns away from the Kingdom of Love -- her 
observation of her “tribe”’s “shocked and altered faces” and the burning of their virtues indicates 
her indignation, disgust even, towards the lack of “good order and common sense” (508), but 
more importantly, the lack of God’s preferential treatment. When the vision fades, Turpin 
remains silent, disgusted, and “immobile”, an indication of her Chardinian immobilism, or 
refusal to struggle towards convergence.  
These two stories, written near the end of O’Connor’s life, show both an increasing 
preoccupation with the mechanics of sight as well as a reappraisal of the necessity of violence in 
achieving revelation. In contrast to earlier protagonists, Calhoun and Mary Elizabeth experience 
a relatively benign violent episode and still achieve revelation ostensibly due to their ability to 
recognize their own hypocrisy. Despite their successful convergence, Turpin’s similarly mild 
trauma and subsequent vision ​fail​ to convince her of her contribution to violence or inspire a 
repudiation of her intolerance. O’Connor seems to be using violence and the action of sight or 
witnessing in conjunction with one another to suggest that they both share the ultimate function 
of inspiring empathy. While more immobilist characters require more of a violent physical 
impetus (such as Thomas), others, such as Calhoun or Julian, may only need to vicariously 
experience a traumatic event or the suggestion of violence through observing others. The 
characters’ visual relationships to their respective revelations further suggest that empathy 
derived from the act of watching and witnessing parallels physical suffering derived from 
physical violence in its kenotic capacity. Though physical suffering (ideally) forces the 
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individual to humanize those who suffer by forcing him or her into the scapegoat position, 
empathy is a more evolved form of the kenotic mindset, requiring the individual to mentally 
suspend the experience of the self in order to imagine the experience of others -- to truly become 
selfless in order to help or understand another person. This phenomenon emerges in Calhoun and 
Mary Elizabeth both when they interact with Singleton as well as when Calhoun recognizes both 
Singleton and himself in the face of Mary Elizabeth. This interaction -- the recognition of the self 
in others-- also indicates that empathy enables the ability to develop self-understanding that one 
can only gain through using others as reflections of the self, suggesting that convergence and 
kenosis ultimately require interaction with the community. This is apparent in Sheppard’s 
self-recognition in Johnson, which directly precedes his rejection of the boy and enables his (too 
late) eventual realization of his neglect of Norton. This pivot to empathy over violence in her 
final stories suggests a hesitant optimism regarding the possibility of a post-violent convergence 
but is necessarily complicated by characters who refuse convergence, such as Turpin. 
The most chilling aspect of “Revelation” lies in its anticipation of atrocity implied by 
Turpin’s continued immobilism. After ruminating on her interpretation of the social hierarchy, 
Turpin encounters problemitizing exceptions to her rules: 
“But here the complexity of it would begin to bear in on her, for some of the new people 
with a lot [of] money were common and ought to be below she and Claud [her husband] 
and some of the people who had good blood had lost their money and had to rent and 
then there were colored people who owned their homes and land as well...Usually by the 
time she had fallen asleep all the classes of people were moiling and roiling around in her 
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head, and she would dream they were all crammed in together in a box car, being ridden 
off to be put in a gas oven.” (492) 
The jarring Holocaust image, packaged almost innocuously in Turpin’s dream, succinctly 
presents the emergent violence in her sustained world-view. The ease and lack of alarm over her 
logical path from social hierarchy to genocide suggests her unrealized complicity in potential 
atrocity. O’Connor employs anthimeria to obscure causation in the image, using “ridden” as a 
transitive verb to insinuate a voluntary ‘rider’, yet literally indicating the existence of an 
obscured subject acting upon the people in the box car. The omission of the grammatical subject 
indicates Turpin’s turning away from “bear[ing]” the mental distress inspired by those who 
complicate her social worldview and her impulse to destroy the complication. Though perhaps 
not as physically violent as the preceding stories, “Revelation”’s undisguised correlation between 
a tendency to turn away, or refusal to bear psychological or emotional distress and wartime 
atrocity reveals the urgency and importance O’Connor attributes to imminent 
revelation/convergence. The Holocaust image additionally reveals O’Connor’s suggestion that 
the Girardian scapegoat cycle increases in severity and destruction as new historical precedents 
replace others in the cultural imagination. Turpin’s dream of Nazi concentration camps (an 
image that is less than fifteen years old in the cultural memory) eliminating the problematic 
groups and not, say, a military execution or even simple segregation suggests that genocide 
supplants the former place of simple homicide (specifically, lynching, which would ostensibly be 
a more familiar image than one of a remote war) as the preferred method of removing 
undesirable community members. This perceived escalation of both imagined and real violence 
suggests that while Turpin may seem relatively innocuous when compared to other, more overtly 
 
Wilson 60 
violent protagonists, her social attitudes, coupled with her immobilism, reflect a potential for the 
greatest atrocity.  
O’Connor additionally anticipates the wartime threat of fascism as a symptom of the 
deferment of revelation/convergence in “The Lame Shall Enter First”. Contrasted with 
Sheppard’s ascetic bedroom, discussed in part two, the over-adornment his late wife’s bedroom, 
with its “wide” bed, “mammoth” dresser, perfumed air, and the mirror that “glint[s]” even in the 
“semi-darkness” (455) suggests an unconfronted potential for revelation, an invitation to struggle 
with grief (diminishment) towards convergence. The obscured, fecund bedroom symbolizes a 
neglected aspect of Sheppard’s psychological/spiritual state and therefore a point of moral 
vulnerability and hypocrisy. Johnson, of course, exploits this vulnerability and defiles the 
untouched sanctity of the shrine, using the late wife’s silver comb to style his hair in “Hitler 
fashion” (455-6). Unlike the “box car” reference in “Revelation”, the fascist capacity infects the 
mind independent of the protagonist’s outward actions; Johnson creates the image from 
Sheppard’s own spiritual blindspot and without his knowledge or complicity, attesting to the 
destructive potential of ideological violence and the ease with which fascism flourishes by 
exploiting unresolved human emotions. While characters like Thomas commit moral failure 
(killing his mother) with independent volition and in reaction to an ideological threat to their 
comfort, Johnson, an independent, active, malicious entity, manipulates Sheppard into 
complying with Hitler-esque demands. As it does for the global community in World War II, the 
revelation of his complicity in violence comes too late for Sheppard.  
O’Connor further suggests that revelatory failure (immobilism or a decision to turn away 
from revelation) encourages increasingly problematic social attitudes, such as the resistance to 
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integration and a nostalgic steadfastness to archaic social hierarchies, as depicted by characters 
such as Julian, his mother, and Turpin (and discussed in more detail elsewhere in this paper). She 
anticipates Girard’s interpretation of an archaic, anthropological Christianity subsisting upon 
sacrificial violence and presents his religion machine, though once anthropologically relevant, as 
a bloodthirsty mechanism that can no longer satiate the globalized, comparatively evolved 
human community.  
O’Connor thus presents the stakes of successful revelation as much higher than 
traditional Christian personal salvation; successful convergence relies on the continuing human 
realization that ideologies facilitating inter-group violence and division threaten the survival of 
the community as a whole in their perpetuation of the scapegoat model. She anticipates 
worsening repetitions of World War II-like episodes of human atrocity and waste as the 
Girardian scapegoat mechanism continues to offer insufficient alleviation of social tension as 
human communities complexify. In so many words, the stakes increase as our history of violence 
compounds. Though Teilhard de Chardin viewed convergence as inevitable, O’Connor is more 
hesitant, insisting on a contemporary urgency to unite and encourage diversity within our 
communities. The gradual decrease in the severity of physical violence in her later stories seems 
to suggest that while physical suffering inspires the revelatory state, the act of looking or 
watching also functions as a penetrative impetus to revelation. Moreover, this pattern evokes the 
stylistic differences between the Old Testament and the New Testament; O’Connor’s earlier 
ruthless critiques, characterized by matricide and suicidal children, overtly condemn hypocrisy 
and a lack of self awareness, which eventually gives way to the more ambiguous, merciful 
narratives of Calhoun and Turpin, which emphasize divine love and acceptance. She seems to 
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follow this pattern to suggest that despite the ironic justice of earlier stories, violence is still 
ultimately a destructive force. While Sheppard and Thomas ostensibly undergo revelation at 
extreme costs, humanity is nonetheless destroyed in the process. The evolution present in this 
selection implies a gradual reduction of violence; while more violence might be initially 
necessary (and inevitable in complexifying communities with new tensions), eventually its utility 
will cease as more of the community converges and empathy (specifically through the action of 
seeing or looking at others) replaces violence as a transformative episode. Ultimately, her 
argument suggests that the need to physically experience human empathy will in turn ideally 
evolve into the Girardian ideal -- that the revealing of violence within social structures will lead 
to its logical repudiation, erasing the need to witness violence before it is repudiated. Turpin’s 
immobilist narrative and the threat of subsequent world wars and increasingly atrocious violence, 
however, shows O’Connor’s sustained wariness in trusting ‘inevitability’ and an urgent call 
towards active convergence.  
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Conclusion 
O’Connor’s later stories depict the development of her own response to the consolidation 
of Christianity with empirical, scientific disciplines of her contemporary moment. Following the 
tradition of Teilhard de Chardin, O’Connor imagines the drama of ongoing convergence playing 
out in prosaic Southern life, but anticipates Girard in her crucial diagnoses of the social 
structures impeding it. She recognizes the increasing damage of cyclical atrocity and 
scapegoating as an emergent antagonist to the inevitability of Chardinian convergence and the 
prevalence of further human destruction if her communities do not realize the latent violence of 
their subscriptions to moral dogma. She further portrays a society increasingly disconnected with 
both empathy and corporeal experience in anticipation of suffering; this aversion to suffering 
suggests an aversion to a kenotic struggling with spirituality itself and an obsession with 
comfort.  
O’Connor’s unique and intricate analysis of the mid-century American spiritual condition 
is often overlooked and underrated as a crucial acknowledgement of the need for religion to 
address its moral shortcomings in light of the increasing global violence that World War II 
atrocity brought to light. In light of God’s silence, and the silence of others to rationalize this 
violence as well as to acknowledge the emergent contradictions between outdated religious 
beliefs and advancements in empirical disciplines, O’Connor constructs an audacious and 
unprecedented theological bridge between the secular and Christian realms. She applies 
anthropological and evolutionary theories to answer theological questions, justifying the utility 
of both in relationship to one another and reimagining the ultimate future of humanity as a fusion 
of the secular and the Christian, an ultimate convergence of perspective. Her subversive 
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anthropological mapping of a society driven by Girardian forces toward Chardinian destinations 
both diagnoses critical social shortcomings as well as novel reincarnations of kenosis. By the end 
of her life, it is uncertain whether O’Connor ultimately shared the optimism of Teilhard de 
Chardin regarding the inevitability of convergence, but I suspect that she hoped her fiction would 
function as a type of vicarious kenosis for her readers in order to inspire self-interrogation.  
Though the majority of O’Connor’s stories take place in the South, her arguments are 
more accurately address a broader American crisis of faith; she crucially characterizes a pivotal 
moment in the American consciousness in regards to religion. From a religious perspective, she 
almost depicts a moment at which humanity has tested, to the best of its ability, God’s 
omnipotence and benevolence and proven both to be lacking. God could not prevent the 
Holocaust, nor did he orchestrate slavery, nor the Civil War; humanity is thus forced to look at 
its reflection and take accountability for a history of blood, greed, and increasingly unfathomable 
self-destruction. O’Connor’s protagonists eventually come to achieve this self-knowledge 
through one medium or another, even when it means being driven to prove their own violent 
nature through otherwise unimaginable brutality. O’Connor thus suggests that inheriting this 
legacy of blood, this original sin, automatically inspires our natural need to repudiate our guilt, to 
construct dogmas that alienate us from sins committed and elicit our consent to suffering still 
actively occurring.  
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